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Why is it that people who are in the possession of 
mobile communication devices are more inclined to 
check the time rather than where they are, unless – 
of course – they are looking for a particular destina-
tion? We think we know where we are. It seems 
obvious! However, we need to ask ourselves again: 
Where are we? The answer to this question certainly 
does not imply that we need to be more concerned 
with our geographical position, with the relation to 
the axes situated beneath us, but rather with how we 
– in connection to ourselves, to others, and to the 
environment – relate to place, especially since we live 
in a world which is certainly not fixed, but is instead 
transitional and indeterminable. This point of view 
entails that our being in this world is embedded in a 
ceaseless process of unforeseeable changes where we 
continually find ourselves in new situations which coin-
cide with different spatial configurations – a procedure 
by which we transition from one state to another and 
reposition ourselves, both literally and figuratively.  
 
Hence, the notion of our locale is to be found in the 
idea of changing positions, animated by our very 
being in this world. In this procedure, place 
(re)emerges in a continuum of shifting states which 
we initiate and continually animate. As a conse-
quence, the notion of place needs to be considered as 
a provisional aggregate – an emerging field – em-
bedded between the interacting conditions of stabil-
ity and instability. In other words, the process by 
which place appears originates in the differentiating 
restlessness of the becoming of something and the 
fading away of something. Only then, between these 
two circumstances, may place emerge. From this 
point of view, place may no longer be considered as 
something which is defined by a permanent location, 
but the result of human interactions, thus dynamic 
and ever changing. 
 
What we require therefore is the general insight that 
places result from processes; they do not possess a 
single, immutable identity. Instead, they are the 
medium through which human interaction assumes 
a material presence and are therefore subject to a 
reality that is generated and modified by the encoun-
ters, narratives, and representations of people inter-
acting with their surrounding. Thus as we travel 
through this world of temporal relations, place may 
no longer be perceived as a permanent and pre-
existing entity, but instead as a state of being.  
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But let us begin at the beginning. The German noun 
Wesen (“being,” OHG wesan) means in its original 
sense “to stay,” “dwelling” and “permanence.”1 Thus 
Wesen refers to something permanent and steadfast 
like the residence, and is accordingly an abode, a site 
of steadfastness. Far-Eastern thought takes an entire-
ly different approach to this concept. There the top-
os for the linguistic equivalent of Wesen stands not 
for “being” but for “path.” This means that, in con-
trast to “being,” which in the Western world general-
ly stands for permanence and closed nature, in Far-
Eastern thought the “path” refers to an endless pro-
cessuality and thus neither closed nature nor appar-
ent direction. The path lacks, so to say, every trace of 
a “being.” Just as the path in itself exhibits no defi-
nite direction, neither does the path of the wayfarer 
indicate any definite direction. Within this, the indi-
vidual is subject to a permanent process of reorienta-
tion; since everything is determined by accident, he 
is caught up in an uninterrupted process of letting go 
and taking grasp again. Thus the traveler must again 
and again become involved with his surroundings. 
He accordingly wanders in a “non-being” and there-
by resides in “non-dwelling.” 
 
This gives rise to a strange manner of traveling. 
Since the route of the journey is not linked to a spe-
cific destination and the path lies undetermined 
before the wanderer.  In this, the wayfarer is free 
from all substantial determination. The endless pro-
cessuality of the path and the ensuing disappearance 
of a substantial closed nature prevent anything from 
subsisting. The sole predefinition from which the 
traveler cannot remove himself is the fact that the 
path lacks any trace of a predetermined direction. 
This means that since the journey does not lead 
anywhere and the wayfarer immediately loses what 
he has attained, he accordingly does not leave behind 
any traces. He abides without lingering, and because 
the journey leads nowhere, he resides in nowhere. 
This in turn has the consequence that the wayfarer 
also no longer experiences time in the sense of a 
mechanically controlled clock-hand – he exists in 
relational terms. This means that he abides neither 
in the past nor in the future. He abides situationally 
in the here and now – in the present. 
 
Against this background, the wanderer converts 
each moment of his journey into an absolutely local 
                                                 
1 Duden, Das Herkunftswörterbuch, Mannheim 2001, 925. 
zone. He responds fully to the landscape, becomes 
one with it – a notion which Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari explored in A Thousand Plateaus. Capital-
ism and Schizophrenia.2 In their disquisition on 
Smooth and Striated Spaces, the authors make refer-
ence to two different types of space.3 Whereas in 
striated space the path is predetermined, in smooth 
space the path exists as something processual and 
abstract which has neither an outline nor a border. 
Such a path, that  
‘delimits nothing […] describes no contour […] that no 
longer goes from one point to another but instead passes 
between points […] always declining […] and deviating 
[…] changing directions’4  
is truly an abstract line – a “line” which one certainly 
wanders along and wonders about. In this space, the 
points do not determine the course of a path, but the 
(third) element lying in between gives rise to the 
path. Whereas in a striated space the points serve to 
define the course of a path, inasmuch as every move-
ment is accomplished from one point to the next one, 
in smooth space ‘every point is a relay and exists only 
as a relay […] along a trajectory’ 5 – a procedure by 
which the wayfarer opens himself constantly to his 
surrounding. He merges with it. Engaging in smooth 
space is therefore ‘at once body based and landscape 
oriented.’ 6 The ‘nomads make the desert no less than 
they are made by it,’ 7 a notion which Maurice Mer-
                                                 
2 Gilles Deleuze/Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia, Minnesota 1987, 474. 
3 The model of  smooth and striated space originally comes from the 
area of music and was developed by the composer Pierre Boulez.   
He contrasts “striated” musical forms which are ordered and fixed 
with “smooth” forms which allow irregularity. Deleuze und Guat-
tari bring this conceptual pair into relation to space. Striated space 
embodies closed, thoroughly structured space in which there exists a 
hierarchical order whose rules represent a fixed element. It is char-
acterized by static relationships which contain both the singular and 
the fundamentally constant within themselves. This space repre-
sents the existence of  a settled identity (e.g. of the state apparatus, 
which  
guarantees order and stability in a regulated structure). It is always 
linked to a specific site which is incised between walls, enclosures, 
and paths. The smooth space, on the other hand, is the space with 
the least deviation. It is to be considered as a field which contains no 
“channels and conduits,” which is not to be defined centrally, 
metrically, or even by means of Euclidian geometry. Cf. 
Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (remark 2). 
4 Ibid., 497f. 
5 Ibid., 380. 
6 Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History, 
Berkley 1997, 306. 
7 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 382 (remark 2). 
leau-Ponty also pursued in Phenomenology of Per-
ception.8 For him as well, the body is continuously 
immersed in the landscape and engaged in an open-
ended dialogue with the environment. 
 
In this process nomads are the vectors of deterritori-
alization in which each of them can be seen as  
’deterritorialized par excellance’ 9 And while they 
move in a ‘polyvocality of directions’ in a limited 
visibility, they experience the surrounding landscape 
without any immediate distance or contour. Yet 
there is an extraordinarily fine topology upon which 
they rely,  
‘like sets of relations (wind, undulations of snow or sand, 
the song of the sand or the cracking ice, the tactile qualities 
of both).’10  
Following Merleau-Ponty’s point of view, the subject 
is therefore to be considered as a ‘mosaic of given 
sensation’11 in which the body is inundated in a con-
tinuous stream of various visual fields, different 
sounds, smells, and tactile stimulations.  
‘What counts for the orientation of the spectacle is not my 
body as it in fact is, as a thing in objective space, but a 
system of possible actions […] defined by its task and 
situation.’12  
Within this scenario, the notion of place is not 
equivalent to a fixed location, but instead is some-
thing which is negotiated in perception as the sub-
ject interacts with the surrounding environment. For 
this reason, the points of orientation never remain 
the same. They change according to the subject, the 
vegetation, the amount of annual rainfall, or the re-
spectively extant grounds. In this, directions are as 
much seen, heard, or felt. This means that, no matter 
where the nomads are ‘on the high sea or in the wind-
swept desert, one listens to directions, ’13 feels them as 
much as one sees them. Smooth space is therefore 
filled with invisible and sonorous intensities such as 
wind, noise, and other forces. It is the space of im-
mediate ‘contact, of small tactile or manual actions,’14 
As a consequence, one must continually find one's 
                                                 
8 Maurice Merleau Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, London 
1962, see chapter “Space.” 
9 Gilles Deleuze, Woran erkennt man Strukturalismus, Berlin 
1992, 381. 
10 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 668 (remark 2). 
11 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, London1962, 249. 
12 Ibid., 249f. 
13 Casey, The Fate of Place, 304 (remark 6). 
14 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 371 (remark 2). 
own way. Since such a journey does not provide a set 
point of view or a distance which one can actually 
measure, the path can only be experienced through 
wandering and wondering, through actions and 
interactions, but most importantly through the use 
of one’s own individual body.15  Guattari und 
Deleuze are accordingly justified in pointing this 
out: ‘Voyaging smoothly is […] a difficult, uncertain 
becoming.’16 What remains for the wayfarer is to 
open himself and to respond again and again to the 
locally occurring signs and symbols which constant-
ly arise around him. The space of the wanderer thus 
provides room for an endless exploration of one’s 
own local absolute – the position which one occupies 
at a particular moment.  
Within this, individuals are forever establishing 
new possibilities of perceiving their environment, 
since by taking short cuts, selecting deviations, or 
improvising itineraries, they ‘privilege, transform, or 
abandon spatial elements.’17 As Merleau-Ponty says: 
We do not see the world ‘behind the back of our 
‚consciousness’, […] but in front of us, as articulations 
of our field’18 through which the itineraries of our 
journey are constantly changing, according to a 
particular moment, mood, and spatial configuration 
in which we find ourselves. 
 
This form of locality, which has as a consequence an 
infinite sequence of arising occurrences with various 
orientations, accordingly no longer takes place at a 
determined place but is instead to be found in the 
endless succession of absolutely local and unpredict-
able events.19 One could say the nomad is in an ‘ab-
solute of passage’ which is to be understood as a  
‘nomadic absolute, as a local integration moving from part 
to part […] [with] an infinite succession of linkages and 
changes in direction. It is an absolute that is one with 
becoming itself, with process.’ 20  
                                                 
15 Ibid., 371. 
16 Ibid., 482. 
17 Michel de Certeau, Walking in the City, in: The Practice of  
Everyday Life, Berkeley 1988, 98. 
18 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The visible and the invisible, Evanston 
Ill. 1968, 180. 
19 According to the authors, a “nomadic absolute” exists. This 
“absolute,” which expresses itself in the form of a local integra-
tion, is considered to be a process of becoming, i.e. the absolute is 
a transition, a site which is not limited. Cf. Deleuze, Woran 
erkennt man Strukturalismus, 684 (remark 9). 
20 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 494 (remark 2). 
Hence this immersing of oneself in smooth space is 
something complex which cannot be assimilated by 
the psyche without further ado, as the field in which 
the traveler immerses himself is infinite, as Guattari 
and Deleuze have pointed out. Thus the path lies 
before the wanderer as if invisible, and the already 
traversed route has already been obliterated. 
 
While sedentary dwellers, such as those who inhabit 
striated spaces, travel in order to get from point A to 
point B, the subjects, as described by Deleuze and 
Guattari as well as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, do not 
simply travel in order to reach a particular destina-
tion. Like the wanderer’s journey, the path of the 
nomad is not to move to a particular destination. 
The act of wandering is to be understood here as a 
residing, inasmuch as the constituent elements of the 
wanderer's residence are designed with respect to the 
respective path. This results in an unusual form of 
dwelling, for it breaks with that idea of home as a 
settled entity to which Martin Heidegger still ad-
heres. Contrary to Heidegger's analysis of space, the 
nomad – whether he sojourns on the steppe, in the 
desert, or upon the eternal ice – is already “at home.” 
This means that, instead of holding onto a settled 
home, the nomad is engaged in a process of continual 
deterritorialization in which he transforms the ground 
for his ongoing journey towards the unknown. 
  
He does this inasmuch as he no longer moves to-
wards a particular place of residence but instead 
dwells during the very act of movement. He is  
‘the moving body, which is the bearer of an un-housed 
inhabitation, the very vehicle of a space without conduits 
or settled sites .’ 21  
His “being at home” thus corresponds to a “trajecto-
ry” which is constantly engaged with the unknown. 
In this, he occupies a place that has the characteristic 
of not being there where it is sought for. One can say 
that it is missing at its “place;” and only something 
that can shift its location one can say it is missing at 
its place. That, however, does not imply that the 
notion of place is to be conceived of as something 
indeterminable. One can determine it, even in its 
shifts. It is simply not assignable. This means that 
even though it is always in its place, it cannot be 
affixed to one particular location.  
Within in this procedure, place is to be regarded as a 
provisional aggregate – an emerging field – that is 
                                                 
21 Casey, The Fate of Place, 307 (remark 6). 
embedded between two interacting conditions, that 
of stability and that of instability. That means, the 
process by which place appears originates in the 
differentiating restlessness of the becoming of some-
thing and the fading away of something. Only then, 
between these two circumstances, can place emerge. 
Therefore, place is difference in itself and its exist-
ence is explicated in the process by which difference 
unfolds. For this reason, place is the empty location 
which makes it possible to engage continuously in an 
infinite number of both directions and orders. Thus 
the entire process of producing place is moved by 
this third element – the empty field. Without this, 
nothing would move. So there can be no forward 
motion without the empty field – the zero point. The 
thereby arising difference thus describes neither 
space nor a place, but rather the third element lying 
in between, the non-place. This is the field which the 
wayfarer occupies. 
 
The fact that non-places are liberated from a con-
crete presence and are not rooted or anchored does 
not allow one to conclude that their existence is of a 
utopian character. They are real, as Michel Foucault 
concludes in his lecture Of Other Spaces.22 In this 
lecture, Foucault establishes the concept of “hetero-
topia” – in contrast to utopias which, as he points 
out, ‘[are] the preserve solely of things […] that in fact 
have no place.’ 23 These heterotopias are the real 
places, he says. They are contested and inverted 
counter-sites. They exist outside of all other places, 
since they ‘are absolutely different from all sites that 
they reflect and speak about’ 24 – just like the nomads 
who are described by Deleuze and Guattari as exist-
ing outside of all other places as well. 
 
However, ‘[to] make a difference, a heterotopia must 
possess a focus for the application of force’ – a force 
however, that is nowhere to be found, ‘but in the 
marginal location of the heterotopia itself.’ 25 Accord-
ingly, non-places are not phenomena that only ever 
find expression on the periphery. Rather, they or-
ganize themselves as contextual marginal situations 
everywhere. These other places are in a constant 
state of flux and change. They can neither be tied to 
                                                 
22 Michel Foucault, Of Other Spaces, in: Diacritics 16 (1986), 1. 
23 Michel Foucault, Les heteropias. Le corps utopique. Published 
in German as Die Heterotopien. Der utopische Körper, Frankfurt 
am Main 2005, 11. 
24 Foucault, Of Other Spaces, 25 (remark 22). 
25 Casey, The Fate of Place, 300 (remark 6). 
a physically extant location nor ascribed to defined 
programmatic purposes. As a reference without an 
affiliation, the none-place, the interrupter, gathers 
the parts of a disconnected system into one group-
ing. Thus there no longer exists a place which comes 
to expression in the form of an immanent point. 
Instead it describes a transitory event-point (the 
empty field) which neither contains anything nor is 
contained in something. The non-place thereby 
embodies a transformative transit-place which not 
only provokes unpredictable changes, but also is 
responsible for their transformation or actualization. 
For this reason, the place is considered to be an in-
dependently acting space of transit which occupies 
in space a position which may be defined but not 
assigned. According to Foucault, it thereby para-
phrases a placeless place which, for the duration of a 
moment, has come to the fore out of an extant order. 
This means that both the existence and the state of 
each individual place are here considered to be a 
provisionally arising configuration of relationships 
becoming manifest in different manners which, 
against the background of an emergent event, be-
come perceptible as an interruption – an interrup-
tion which, according to Pierre Bourdieu, Michel de 
Certeau, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault, is 
equivalent to a critical turning-point that both 
breaks up and alters the continuity of an extant or-
der, always for the purpose of opening a new field. 
Seen against this background, the individual can 
no longer be considered to be a passenger or a trav-
eler passing through. Rather, the individual assumes 
the status of a transient who, as long as he continues 
to interact, is in transit. Consequently every non-
place is dependent upon transients. By shifting their 
positions, it is they who find themselves in new situ-
ations coinciding with unique spatial configurations 
– transitioning from one moment to another and 
repositioning themselves, both literally and figura-
tively. Thus each emergent field, as the sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu points out, corresponds to a  
‘potentially open space of play whose boundaries are dy-
namic […] devoid of inventor and much more fluid and 
complex than any game that one might ever design.’ 26  
The field thereby corresponds to a dynamic configu-
ration of elements which move in a reciprocal inter-
action between various systems. Each newly arising 
field develops in the disruptions which occur due to 
                                                 
26 Pierre Bourdieu/Loic J. D. Waquant, An invitation to reflexive 
sociology, Chicago 1992, 104. 
the shifting positions of the transients – a point of 
view subscribed to by Pierre Bourdieu as well. For 
him, each “action field” arises out of the interactions 
of the subjects, inasmuch as each field constitutes 
itself out of the relationships of the protagonists who 
have them as their immediate environment. From 
this perspective, every field is a relative construct by 
which individuals participate.  
 
This type of field can be compared with the idea of 
the rhizome developed by Deleuze and Guattari. 
There as well, shifting of position takes place. Plat-
eaus play an important role here. Plateaus have nei-
ther a beginning nor an end; they are to be found 
between things. They are the critical elements which 
represent a point of transition, a site in transit. This 
point of transition indicates the difference which 
weaves a connection between entities and simulta-
neously makes a transformation possible. Plateaus 
are characterized by a dispersion of events. They are 
not organized hierarchically and do not constitute a 
unity. For this process, the events are a conditio sine 
qua non; without designating a direction, they organ-
ize and interconnect themselves in an array which is 
neither stable nor instable, but instead metastable. 
 
Events are thereby part of a dynamic process whose 
outcome is uncertain and which brings the virtual into 
connection with the actual, whereby the virtual should 
not be understood as the “unreal” in this context.  
‘It exits, one might say as a free difference or singularity, 
not yet combined with other differences into a complex 
ensemble or salient form.’27  
This means that the virtual does not need first to be 
realized but must simply be actualized, for it already 
possesses a transition capable of being developed. 
Accordingly, the virtual element (within an event)  
‘is gathered, selected – let us say incarnated – it passes 
from one moment-event […] in order to emerge – differ-
ently, uniquely – within another.’ 28  
Events are thereby components of dynamic referen-
tial systems which constitute themselves out of a 
flowing multiplicity. And a world constituted out of 
diversity and flows comprises ‘not pre-given, ideal 
forms but metastable shapes floating in a river of 
                                                 
27 Sanford Kwinter, The Complex and the Singular, Architectures 
of Times, Toward a Theory of the Event in Modernist Culture, 
Cambridge 2002, 8. 
28 Ibid., 8. 
ever-generating differences’29 – differences ‘that [are] 
produced at some point along a particular flow […] to 
induce a difference.’ 30 Every event creates a differ-
ence inasmuch as it transports information and 
thereby summons up, between the plateaus – a 
transformation which is always of a “site-specific” 
nature. And because in that process the events do 
not occupy the surface but instead pass over it with-
out ever touching it, the energy is not localized upon 
the surface but is linked to formation and re-
formation. In other words, life lives along the border 
of itself, along its delimitation, in the act of dis-
placement – comparable with Ezra Park's concept of 
the “marginal man.” He as well lives along a border, 
upon a threshold across which the most highly varied 
dissonances can be caused to oscillate, as Homi Bhabha 
has pointed out. 
 
Thus the “marginal man” is not an individual on the 
periphery but a figure at the center. He is, as de-
scribed in Human Migration and the Marginal 
Man,31 the type of person who is mobile, transitory, 
and not anchored. This does not mean, however, 
that the “marginal man” should be considered to be 
a “man at the edge” or a “man on the periphery,” as 
he is often erroneously portrayed, but instead a man 
“straddling the boundary.” As a person distinguished 
by his ambiguity, he strides through a realm that 
reveals few or no attributes of its past or future con-
dition. Since this personality type fits into no particu-
lar context, he is forever located in a place which 
could equally be called a non-place. He thereby occu-
pies a non-attributable place without fixed address, 
from which he can relentlessly assume new positions. 
 
Apart from looking at the “marginal man” as a cul-
tural concept, one could conclude that Park’s notion of 
the “marginal man” locates the “placeless place” of the 
subject between the two processes of consolidating the 
subject through self-assertion and dissolving it through 
assimilation. In these terms, then, “marginal man” is  
‘a concept of subjectivity whose constructional principle 
[suggests] neither hermetic coherence nor open incoher-
                                                 
29 Ibid., 24. 
30 Ibid., 26. 
31 Robert Ezra Park, Human Migration and the Marginal Man, in: 
Classic Essays On The Culture of Cities, ed. by Richard Sennett, 
New York 1969. 
ence, but something one could describe as ‚situatively 
limited incoherence.’ 32  
Accordingly, as Rolf Lindner remarks, the “marginal 
man” can be considered as the personified carrier of 
a transformation and the embodiment of “modern 
subjectivity.” 33 Thus he lives on the “subjective mar-
gins” of his own self, on the boundary of his own 
displacement.34 Consequently, those occupying the 
margins do not merely personify the boundary but 
also personify transition. Always on the move, al-
ways intent on change, they are constantly headed 
for new shores to forge links with their contexts. As 
such, the subject is analogous to the sea-borne ship 
described in Foucault’s study Of Other Spaces. In-
tended for translocation and ceaseless transition, the 
vessel pits itself against the infinite ocean – an ocean 
over which, in unflagging motion, boundaries are 
permanently redrawn and transgressed. And, as de 
Certeau observes, because these shifters never tire of 
charting new boundaries, they assume the role of a 
transgressive itinerant who ‘is the primum mobile 
[…] from which all the action proceeds.’ 35  
 
It is a similar commuting itinerant whom Gerald 
Raunig has in mind when he invokes the figure of 
Charon for his study of the aesthetics of transgres-
sion in Ästhetik der Grenzüberschreitung.36 Whereas 
Virgil depicts Charon in the Aeneid as a cheerless 
character whose task, for a small charge, is to ferry 
the dead in his boat across the river Acheron, the 
river of the underworld and the entrance to Hades, 
the realm of the dead, Raunig sees this ferryman as a 
translating entity who, like “marginal man,” ‘does 
not [scan] the dividing line between this world and 
the hereafter’37 but who opens up a space of transi-
tion or intermediacy on the very boundary separat-
ing the two. This point of transit creates the differ-
ence which weaves a connection between entities 
and at the same time enables transformation to oc-
cur. This not only makes him the link joining the 
                                                 
32 Michael Makropoulos/Robert Ezra, Modernität zwischen Urbani-
tät und Grenzidentität, in: Culture Club, ed. by Martin Hofmann, 
Tobias Korta and Sibylle Niekisch, Frankfurt am Main 2004, 54. 
33 Rolf Lindner, Die Entdeckung der Stadtkultur. Soziologie aus 
der Erfahrung der Reportage, Frankfurt am Main 1990, 211. 
34 Gilles Deleuze, Twelve Series of the Paradox, in: The Logic of 
Sense, New York 1990, 104. 
35 Michel de Certeau, Railway Navigation and Incarnation, in: The 
Practice of Everyday Life, Berkeley 1988, 113. 
36 Virgil, The Aeneid, New Haven 2008. 
37 Gerald Raunig, Charon, Eine Ästhetik der Grenzübertragung, 
Wien 1999, 109. 
two shores, but also an ‘intermediary space located within 
a difference.’ 38 As the scintillating protagonist dwelling 
between formative systems, he occupies an operative 
interstitial space by means of which various differences 
begin to oscillate in a transformative place of transit. 
 
The subject in this process is neither here nor there, 
neither one nor the other. It positions itself, always 
subliminally, on a threshold – ‘[n]either excluded nor 
included […] in the fuzzy realm’ 39 of this blurred hiatus. 
The subject, then, is analogous to a liminal being which, 
as Victor Turner has written in The Ritual Process: 
Structure and Anti-Structure, is situated between posi-
tions, inhabiting a liminal space of passage, through 
which it repeatedly changes its positions.40 
 
Thus the process of localization is directly linked 
here to the presence of a subject and its relationship 
to its immediate environment. Like Charon, the 
subject takes up a mediating role between various 
intensities. It translates, literally “carries over,” in-
asmuch as it takes up fragments of its surroundings 
in passing, even while leaving others unnoticed. It 
inhabits a liminal space of passage through which it 
repeatedly marks, transforms, and negotiates new 
positions within an existing framework. 
 
This is how we arrive at such strange journeys. In-
stead of relying on a fixed point in space, the wan-
derer travels in the absence of anchoring points by 
converting each moment along his journey into an 
absolutely local zone, a non-place. There, in this 
nowhere, is the travelers' place of residence. And 
since their homes are tailored to match their passage, 
their ‘elements of […] dwelling are conceived in terms 
of the trajectory that is forever mobilizing them.’ 41 
Therefore place is always present wherever the tran-
sients set their “souls.” Thus every place is situated at 
a particular point in space, but not in an attributable 
location. In other words, the subjects are always in 
their place, but they cannot be tied to any specific 
location. It is for this reason that the individual also 
has the capacity, over and over again, to connect 
with his context in a space which encompasses as 
many directions as it does orders. As a result, this 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 109. 
39 Michel Serres, The parasite, Minneapolis 2007, 246. 
40 The term ‘liminal’ is derived from the Latin limen and means 
“threshold,” also impliying transition across a boundary from one 
state to the next. 
41 Deleuze/Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 380 (remark 2).  
kind of “roaming” means that each occurrence is 
both unpredictable and a matter of chance. The 
individual is therefore subject to a permanent pro-
cess of reorientation: Since everything is determined 
by accident, he is caught up in an uninterrupted pro-
cess of letting go and taking grasp again. No individu-
al is able to evade this dynamic of change, the devel-
opment it engenders, and its transience. Being entan-
gled with place involves being continually immersed 
in its initiation, in the process of becoming:  
‘We shall not cease from exploration  
And at the end of all our exploring  
Will be to arrive where we started  
And know the place for the first time.’42 
 
 
                                                 
42 T.S. Eliot, Collected Poems. 1909-1962, ‚Little Gidding’, San 
Diego 1991, 200. 
